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Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver
A discussion of the history and theory of punitive damages which results
in advocating their application in a drunk driving context after giving
due consideration to the pros and cons of such a sanction.
An analysis of case law will reveal the underlying rationale that has mo-
tivated certain jurisdictions in applying this severe penal approach in an
attempt to deter and curtail the senseless destruction on our nation's high-
ways as well as exploring the impetus behind those other jurisdictions that
do not utilize the remedy of punitive damages. The culminating focus is on
California's position in this regard.
Finally, there is an apropos discussion of the behind the scene, but per-
vasive, role that policy considerations regarding insurance coverage play
in the question of subjecting insured drunk drivers to the liability of puni-
tive damages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Charles Taylor, an exuberant and handsome eighteen year old
college student, climbed into his Volkswagen van to go to work.
When Taylor, an honors student and varsity athlete, was only a
short distance from his destination, an event took place that irre-
versibly altered his life. An oncoming car suddenly swerved into
his lane and collided with him head-on. The brutal force of the
impact thrust the Volkswagen's steering wheel into Taylor's face
with gruesome results. The steering wheel rim tore into his
mouth, shattered his teeth, severed his tongue, and literally am-
putated his lower jaw.' Today, Charles Taylor is a grossly disfig-
1. Facts from the case of Taylor v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal. 3d
890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979), as described in an address by Jerome
Jackson, counsel for the plaintiff, to the legal fraternity of Phi Delta Phi, initiation
banquet, Pepperdine University School of Law (Sept. 13, 1979). Taylor is dis-
ured dental cripple who will never experience such simple and
normal pleasures as a loved one's kiss or a savory meal. On that
fateful day, Charles Taylor became a statistic2-one of thousands
of Americans who annually are killed or maimed by the drunken
driver.3
The incalculable cost 4 of the slaughter, destruction and anguish
caused by the drunken driver has given vent to a public outcry of
cussed at length in Section III. C. Unfortunately, these facts are not altogether un-
common. See, e.g., Aronsen, Let's Get the Drunk Out of the Driver's Seat, TODAY'S
HEALTH, Dec. 1974, at 38; Morando, Smash-Up!, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1977, at
102.
2. It is generally believed that a high percentage of all highway fatalities and
injuries are directly attributable to intoxicating beverages and drugs. See gener-
ally, G. HALVERSON, STOP THE DRUNK DRIVER (1970); DRINKING, (J. Ewing & B.
Rouse eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DRINKING]; Cramton, The Problem of the
Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A.J. 995 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Problem of the
Drinking Driver]; Little, Control of the Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal
Creativity, 54 A.B.A.J. 555 (1968); [1971] EDUCATION AND ACCIDENT REPORTS DMi-
SION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES; DEP'T. OF CALI-
FORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, [1977] ANN. REPORT OF FATAL AND INJURY MOTOR
VEHICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS 70. Some believe these statistics are only the tip of
the iceberg since they reflect only arrests. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d
144, 154, 577 P.2d 699, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978). Some sources dispute this
statistical data on the basis that it is incomplete and biased. See Hostile Drivers
and Alcohol Don't Mix, 12 TRIAL 60-2 (1976).
3. For the purpose of this comment, "drunken driver" may be defined as one
who is voluntarily intoxicated to the extent that his or her blood-alcohol (or drug)
level is sufficient to warrant their arrest in the jurisdiction where the accident oc-
curs. Normally, a blood-alcohol level of .10% is sufficient. See, e.g., CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23126(a) (3) (West 1971).
"Voluntary intoxication," as described above, refers not only to intoxication re-
sulting from excessive use of alcoholic beverages, but also to that intoxication re-
sulting from the use of drugs and narcotics. Thus, the psycho-biological issue of
whether alcohol and drugs are truly "voluntary" is overlooked for the purpose of
this comment. See generally, DRINKING, supra note 2, at 122-25; Cramton, Driver
Behavior and Legal Sanctions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 437-38 (1969); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 14 (1967).
It should also be noted that this comment is limited to cases in which the de-
fendant motorist was, in fact, intoxicated at the time of the accident, and does not
include cases in which a claim for punitive damages was rejected for the reason
that the evidence failed to establish the intoxication of the defendant motorist.
However, certain cases will be analyzed from jurisdictions refusing to assess puni-
tive damages against drunken drivers even though a possible reason for doing so
was inconclusive evidence; the court's language in these cases nevertheless war-
rants discussion.
The above-mentioned definitions are certainly an improvement over the rough
and ready classification described in a recent California case: "Not drunk is he
who from the floor Can rise alone and still drink more; But drunk is he who pros-
tate lie Without the power to drink or rise." Cooper v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp.,
45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 394 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 n.1. (1975).
4. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144,154, 571 P.2d 699, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978).
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concern and outrage. Society has responded in a variety of ways
in its efforts to curb the senseless carnage attributable to drunken
driving. Such responses have included the institution of rehabili-
tative programs, 5 legislation of increasingly severe penal laws6
and in surprisingly few jurisdictions, the imposition of punitive
damages in civil actions. 7
This comment will focus exclusively on the last of these re-
sponses and will be limited to an evaluation of punitive damages
5. See generally CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND DEP'T OF ALCO-
HOL AND DRUG ABUSE, AN EVALUATION OF ALCOHOL ABUSE TREATMENT As AN AL-
TERNATIVE TO DRIVERS LICENSE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION 7 (1978); DRINKING,
supra note 2, at 135; The Problem of the Drinking Driver, supra note 2, at 998; Note,
Deterring the Drinking Driver: Treatment v. Punishment, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALA. L. REV.
244 (1978); Hornaday, Sentencing the Drinking Driver in Alaska: The Homer Alter-
nate Work Program, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALA. L. REV. 235 (1978); Ross & Blumenthal, Sanc-
tions for the Drinking Driver. An Experimental Study, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1974);
Why Reducing Traffic Deaths Proves Elusive, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, April
24, 1978, at 47.
6. Many states are reacting to the increase in alcohol-automobile related
deaths and injuries by increasing fines and revoking driver's licenses. Other
states, however, have taken an even less lenient approach. Misner, Severe Penal-
ties for Driving Offenses: A Deterrence Analysis, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677. See, e.g.,
Note, Criminal Law: Murder by Auto, Kentucky's Hard Line Stance Against
Drunken Drivers, 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 279 (1978).
7. To date only 25 jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether punitive
damages may be assessed against intoxicated drivers; of these jurisdictions, a ma-
jority of 20 have answered this issue in the affirmative. These jurisdictions in-
clude: Arizona (Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60, 274 P. 639 (1929)); Arkansas (Miller v.
Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948)); California (Taylor v. Sup. Ct. of Los
Angeles, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979)); Connecticut (Infeld
v. Sullivan, 151 Conn. 506, 199 A.2d 693 (1964)); Delaware (Walczak v. Healy, 280
A.2d 728 (Del. 1971)); District of Columbia (Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1947)) (applying Maryland law); Florida (Ingram v. Petit, 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla.
1976)); Georgia (Chitwood v. Stoner, 60 Ga. App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (1939)); Illinois
(Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (1958)); Iowa (Sebastian v. Wood,
246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954)); Kansas (Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266
P.2d 263 (1954)); Kentucky (Wiggington's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W.
933 (1920)); Maryland (Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944)); Missis-
sippi (Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951));
New Mexico (Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167 (1971)); New York
(Colligan v. Fera, 76 Misc. 2d 22, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1973)); North Carolina
(Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74 (1970)); Ohio (Payne v. Daley, 51
Ohio Misc. 65, 367 N.E.2d 75 (1977)); Oklahoma (Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247
P.2d 964 (1952)); Oregon (Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973)); Penn-
sylvania (Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970)); Tennessee
(Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945)); Texas (Sears Roebuck &
Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 32, (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)); Virginia (Baker v. Marcus, 201
Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960)); Wisconsin (Ayala v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 272
Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956)).
within the context of drunken driving.8 Before this evaluation can
be thoroughly understood and appreciated, a fundamental knowl-
edge of punitive damages is required. Therefore, the nature and
purposes of punitive damages will be discussed. Next, case law
will be analyzed from those states that have confronted the issue
of whether, and under what circumstances, punitive damages
may be properly assessed against drunken drivers. Special em-
phasis will be given to California's approach to this issue.9 Fi-
nally, there will be a brief examination of the concurrent issue of
insurance and its impact on punitive damages.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages, also known as exemplary, vindictive dam-
ages or "smart money," have been defined as a class of monetary
damages awarded in tort actions' 0 that traverse the concept of
fully compensating an injured plaintiff for harm actually caused."
The punitive aspect, which grants damages in excess of what the
8. Only a few comments discuss this narrow topic. See Franson, Exemplary
Damages in Vehicle Accident Cases, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 93 (1975); Liability of An In-
toxicated Driverfor Punitive Damages, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (1956); Punitive
Damages and the Intoxicated Driver An Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 307 (1979); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Applica-
tion in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960); The Drinking
Driver and Punitive Damages, 7 WAKE FOREST L.R. 528 (1971).
9. See Taylor v. Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 853,
157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
10. By "tort actions" it must be remembered that the major emphasis is
placed on actions involving personal injuries. Many states, including. California,
do not allow punitive damages in wrongful death actions. This is also true of ac-
tions brought under the Employer's Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). For
further information on this topic, including those jurisdictions that allow punitive
damages in death actions, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES
§ 103, at 356 (1935) [hereinafter cited as C. MCCORMICK]. It must also be
remembered that punitive damages are not allowed in contract cases, unless cer-
tain tort aspects are present. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 206-07 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as D. DOBBS].
It is indeed possible that in some states, one may be held liable in punitive dam-
ages for acts that cause great bodily harm, but that the identical behavior is sanc-
tifled with immunity from punitive damages should the hapless victim die. This is
the converse of the criminal law wherein the severity of the penalty corresponds
with the severity of the act. Sadly enough, a drunken driver who kills a family
may not be held liable for punitive damages, while another drunken driver may be
held liable for breaking a limb.
11. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979), defines punitive damages as
follows:
§ 908 Punitive Damages
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nomi.
nal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outra-
geous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
conduct in the future.
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injuries actually merit, is an anomaly 2 in tort law, which is
viewed as primarily compensatory in nature.13 The incongruity of
punitive damages, which is more closely aligned with the criminal
law rather than the civil law, has led some courts to sharp criti-
cism and others to high praise. The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire said: "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It
is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescense, deforming the sym-
metry and body of the law."'14 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
on the other hand, noted, "The law giving exemplary damages is
an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law."1 5
The doctrine of punitive damages continues to be the subject of
heated, often vitriolic, debate among legal scholars 16 as well.
A. The Historical Development of Punitive Damages
The doctrine of punitive damages has been an integral aspect of
the canon laws of numerous religions for centuries. The doctrine
has been found as early as 2000 B.C. in The Code of Hammurabi,
and 1400 B.C. in the Hittite Laws. The Hindu Code of Manu, writ-
ten in 200 B.C., makes reference to exemplary damages as does
the Judeo-Christian and Hebrew law.'7 Classic Roman law is also
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference
to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of
fact can properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the
nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
12. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as W. PROSSER].
13. Id. at 7.
14. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 343, 382 (1873).
15. Luther v, Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 238, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (1914).
16. See generally DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNrrIVE
DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); DuFFY, PuNrrivE DAMAGES: A Doc-
TRINE WHICH SHOULD BE ABOUSHED IN THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 9
(1969); FORD, THE CONsTrrTUONALrrY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE CASE AGAINST
PUNITrVE DAMAGES 15-16 (1968); Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspec-
tive, TRIAL Nov. 1978, at 48; Corboy, Should Punitive Damages be Abolished? A
Statement for the Negative, 1965 ABA SECT. INS. NEGL. & CoMP. L 292; Ghiardi,
Should Punitive Damages be Abolished? A Statement for the Affirmative, 1965
ABA SECT. INS. NEGL. & COMP. L. 282; Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Dam-
ages, 8 FORUM 411 (1972); Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and
Compensatory Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L REV. 585 (1971); Note, Exem-
plary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); Note, The Imposi-
tion of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966). Punitive Damages: A Common Law Doctrine in Need of
Legislative Reform, 16 TRIAL 30 (1980).
17. Exodus 12:29, 22:1, 22:4, 22:9.
replete with punitive provisions beginning with the Twelve Ta-
bles, which have been dated to 450 B.C. Similarly, punitive dam-
ages were also extant in the writings of ancient Greek scholars.18
The fact that punitive damages may be found in the writings of
literally every ancient civilization of note, attests to both the doc-
trine's durability as well as its controversial nature.
Early English common law initially makes statutory reference
to the concept of punitive damages in the sixty-five English Acts
of parliament, with judicial recognition arising in the case of
Huckle v. Money.19 It has been suggested that Huckle was the re-
sult of the inability of courts of the period to set aside jury
awards.20 However, by the time Huckle came to the fore, courts
had begun to set aside verdicts they considered excessive.21 How-
ever, despite this relatively new found authority, the court in
Huckle upheld the jury's award,22 reasoning that the defendant's
onerous conduct 23 gave the jury ample justification to award puni-
tive damages, despite only the slight injury suffered by the plain-
tiff.24 In recent years, however, England has placed considerable
restrictions on the use of punitive damages. 25
Twenty one years following the decision of Huckle, punitive
damages became an aspect of American common law. 26 Later, the
doctrine survived constitutional attack in Day v. Worth27 where
the defendant's conduct was "wanton and malicious, or gross and
outrageous. '28 Since 1851, the vast majority of American states 29
18. Plato, Protagoras, 324b; Plato, Laws, 9.855b and 9.934a.
19. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
20. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517,
518-19 (1967).
21. Id.
22. In Huckle, Lord Camden wrote, "[TIhe small injury done to the plain-
tiff, . . . did not appear to the jury .... The great point of law . . . they saw a
magistrate... exercising arbitrary power ... and I think they have done right in
giving exemplary damages." 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. England has abolished punitive damages except where they could serve a
"useful purpose," by penalizing oppressive and arbitrary action by government
servants, or tortious conduct calculated to make a profit for the actor and the like.
See Rookes v. Barnard, [19641 A.C. 1129.
26. Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 May) 6 (1784).
27. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
28. Id.
29. California accepted the doctrine of punitive damages in 1872 by enacting
Civil Code § 3294, which provided for the award of punitive damages "Where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." CA. CrV. CODE § 3294
(West 1970). The earliest reported case in which the California Supreme Court
had the opportunity to review the validity of the doctrine of punitive damages was
Russell v. Dennison, 45 Cal. 337 (1873). California decisions addressing the possi-
ble juxtaposition of punitive damages and drunken driving will be discussed in
section III. C.
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and the federal government 30 have adopted the doctrine of puni-
tive damages, with only a handful of states modifying3l or re-
jecting32 the doctrine.
B. The Nature and Purpose of Punitive Damages
Superficially, punitive damages are a response to a defendant's
flagrant and outrageous misconduct. 33 There are several justifica-
tions for punitive damages. The most commonly cited objectives
are the punishment of the defendant, the deterrence of the de-
fendant from further offense, the deterence of others from similar
conduct and the vindication of society.34 Yet another objective is
reimbursement for the plaintiff's noncompensable injuries. 35
Whatever justification is advanced, the general consensus is that
punitive damages constitute a windfall to the plaintiff, and are not
a matter of right. Instead, courts with such views construe the
award of punitive damages as lying wholly as a matter within the
discretion of the trier of fact.36 Moreover, even the jury's predilec-
tions are bridled by the prerequisite that compensatory damages
30. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 86 (1896).
31. Several states view punitive damages as serving a compensatory function;
Michigan (Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922)); New Hampshire
(Bixby v. Dunlop, 56 N.H. 456 (1876)). Connecticut limits punitive damages to the
expenses of litigation, which must be proved. Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127
Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
32. The punitive damages doctrine has been rejected in several states; Massa-
chusetts (Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R. Co., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914));
Nebraska (Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537
(1935)); Washington (Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952)).
Louisiana is occasionally listed in this category, and it is true that Louisiana deci-
sions sometimes say that punitive damages are not awarded in the absence of
statute, see Post v. Rodigue, 205 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1967); but a good imitation of
punitive damages is granted, if not the genuine thing, on the theory that they are
compensatory in some fashion, even though based upon wrongs "aggravated by
circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud or wanton and wicked con-
duct .. " Loeblich v. Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1959). Presumably a thorn
by any other name will hurt as much.
33. See Note, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in
Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823, 828 (1978).
34. Punitive damages have been held to serve a compensatory purpose as
well. See generally cases cited note 32 supra.
35. W. PROSSER, § 2, supra note 12, at 9. Many writers are extremely critical of
this, arguing that if the compensatory damages system in American jurisprudence
is deficient, it should be directly remedied, and not be supplemented by twisting
punitive damages into serving a purpose for which they were not intended. See
section IV. A. and note 74 infra and accompanying text.
36. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 13; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 84, at 296.
must exist before punitive damages may be imposed.3 7
Punitive damages are parasitic in nature and courts will not
award them in the absence of compensatory damages. 38 This con-
cept is complex in its application. The rule's intricacy has so per-
plexed those seeking punitive damages that one notable author
was moved to comment that there is "a conspicuous amount of
confusion and of conflict, some apparent and some real, . . . on
the subject of ... compensatory damages as a prerequisite to an
award of exemplary damages." 39 Thus, while it is understood that
compensatory damages are required before punitive damages can
be assessed, there remains considerable speculation as to how
this requirement is fulfilled. One expert astutely capsulized the
dilemma:
The problem derives in part from the ambiguity of the word "damages."
Sometimes the term has meant pecuniary loss; at other times it has in-
cluded substantial non-pecuniary losses, as where the plaintiffs good
name is injured by libel without costing him his job or any other measura-
ble advantage; and sometimes it has included purely nominal damages,
where neither pecuniary nor substantial dignitary losses have occurred.
The problem also derives in part from the fact that in some instances, the
plaintiff has no valid claim at all, that is, none for any kind of damages,
unless he can show a measurable injury, while in other cases, the defend-
ant's act gives rise to a cause of action for at least nominal damages even
if the plaintiff has suffered no harm at all.
4 0
This uncertainty as to what constitutes damages adds a consid-
erable measure of difficulty to many cases in which punitive dam-
ages are sought. Perhaps nowhere is this quagmire so acutely
apparent as in cases where nominal damages are the sole com-
pensation a plaintiff receives. Ironically, instances where nominal
damages are the only compensation awarded are the instances
where punitive damages become most desirable. 41 Differences
37. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 208. There are other limitations on the
assessment of punitive damages, which will not be addressed here: punitive dam-
ages must be commensurate with the amount of compensatory damages, as well
as the defendant's wealth and equity will not entertain claims for punitive dam-
ages. See generally Note, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A
Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823 (1978); D. DOBBS, supra note 10,
§ 3.9, at 211-14.
38. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10 § 83, at 293. Another description of this para-
sitic nature is "that the allowance of exemplary damages does not widen the range
of actionable wrongs." Id.
39. Id.
40. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 208 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
41. See text accompanying notes 67-72 infra. See also, W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 2, at 14. While it may be argued that the large compensatory awards that
many drunken drivers could be held liable for is a sufficient incentive alone, there
could be instances where actual damages are minimal, and in those instances pu-
nitive damages would prove a viable incentive. Additionally, punitive damages are
not insurable, and thus arguably would provide a strong deterrent to drinking and
driving. This will be discussed further in section IV.
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exist among the various jurisdictions regarding whether or not ex-
emplary damages may be imposed in nominal damages cases.
Some jurisdictions clearly favor them,42 and others disallow them
completely.43
Unfortunately, this confusion has extended itself into the jury
room as well. In those instances where a jury is instructed on
both compensatory and punitive damages, it is quite possible that
the jury will blur the two, particularly where damages are
vague, 44 and award nominal damages and a large punitive award
-a punitive award that is largely compensatory under the evi-
dence. 45 Therefore, many attorneys are understandably reluctant
to request an instruction on punitive damages. 46
Another important consideration, perhaps the most significant
in terms of the drunken driver, is the defendant's state of mind at
the time the tort is committed. One must establish that a defend-
ant motorist, while under the influence of alcohol, nevertheless
manifested a state of mind justifying the imposition of punitive
damages.47 The discussion of case law in the subsequent sections
will demonstrate that this is the greatest hurdle facing the plain-
tiff's attorney.
Professor Prosser concisely emphasized the need for a requisite
state of mind when he stated that "something more than the mere
commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages" 48
and that "it is not so much the particular tort committed as the
defendant's motives and conduct in committing it which will be
important as the basis of the award."49 One's motives or state of
mind and the subsequent conduct exhibited in furtherance of that
mental posture are, for the most part, literally inseparable, and
any attempts to distinguish them are essentially academic. It is a
rare instance when an individual's state of mind can be examined
in a vacuum, without a simultaneous examination of the conduct
which is the physical manifestation of the particular thought proc-
42. Maring-Crawford Motor Co. v. Smith, 285 Ala. 477, 233 So. 2d 484 (1970);
Landur v. Livingston, 394 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. App. 1965).
43. Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279 (1878). "If all the individual injury is
merely technical and theoretical, what is the punishment to be inflicted for?" Id.
44. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 209.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. See also Clarkson, Drunken-
ness, Constructive Manslaughter and Specific Intent, 41 MOD. L. REV. 478 (1978).
48. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 7.
49. Id., at 11 (emphasis added).
ess. Usually, a state of mind is imputed to a defendant based on
his conduct and the circumstances underlying that specific behav-
ior. In effect, one's mental state is determined on the basis of cir-
cumstantial evidence. It will subsequently be demonstrated that
disagreement exists among the numerous states that have ad-
dressed these considerations, with states currently opposing the
imposition of punitive damages demanding that the requisite
state of mind be established independently of the defendant's
conduct, and states favoring the imposition of punitive damages
concentrating primarily on the conduct under scrutiny.50
When considering an award of exemplary damages 5 1 many
terms have evolved from repeated judicial attempts to precisely
define the imperative mental state52 and accompanying conduct.
Such attempts have included such words as "malicious,"53 "op-
pressive," "evil," "wicked," "wanton," "morally culpable" and
"conscious disregard."54 While jurisdictions differ in their prefer-
ences for these descriptive words and the burden of proof at-
tached to each, it is generally agreed that the defendant's actions
must fall somewhere among these adjectives before the question
of punitive damages may be submitted to a jury.55 In addition,
50. See notes 95-142 infra and accompanying text.
51. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 205; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 10.
52. Since these damages are assessed for punishment and not for repara-
tion, a positive element of conscious wrongdoing is always required. It
must be shown either that the defendant was actuated by ill will, malice,
or evil motive (which may appear by direct evidence of such motive, or
from the inherent character of the tort itself, or from the oppressive char-
acter of his conduct, sometimes called "circumstances of aggravation"), or
by fraudulent purposes, or that he was so wanton and reckless as to
evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 280.
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 9-10. Malice has also been defined as:
The intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with
an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will im-
ply an evil intent. A condition of mind which prompts a person to do a
wrongful act willfully, that is, on purpose to the injury of another, or to do
intentionally a wrongful act toward another without justification or ex-
cuse. A conscious violation of the law (or the prompting of the mind to
commit it) which operates to the prejudice of another person. A condition
of the mind showing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief. Cockrell v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. R. 218, 117 S.W.2d 1105, 1109, 1110.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1979).
54. Conscious disregard may be defined in terms of the definition of the word
"reckless." One is reckless or in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of
others when he or she performs an act or fails to perform an act which he or she
knows or has reason to know will unreasonably increase the risk of physical harm
to another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 34, at 185.
55. See Smith v. Glemmons, 216 Ala. 52, 112 So. 442 (1927), where the court de-
fined reckless as "very negligent," but when discussing punitive damages the
court speaks of reckless and wanton acts. In Bailey v. Smith, 132 S.C. 212, 128 S.E.
423 (1925), the court said:
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punitive damages are not recoverable where a certain course of
action is pursued innocently or on the advice of counsel.56
Just as confusion exists with respect to the issue of damages, it
also exists with regard to the defendant's state of mind and the
phraseology used to describe it. Many courts have employed the
ambiguous and unfortunate expression "gross negligence" in
describing the mental state and conduct warranting the assess-
ment of punitive damages. 5 7 Most authorities, however, feel this
term easily implies more than simply a high degree of negligence,
but rather, is negligence that is manifested through behavior so
callous, careless or indifferent as to amount to a conscious disre-
gard of the rights of others.5 8
While much has been written on the issue,5 9 courts have relied
primarily on the terms "malice" and "conscious disregard" in ad-
dressing the question of whether or not a drunken driver should
be held liable for exemplary damages. As the jurisdictional analy-
sis of case law in the pages to follow will show, states presently
allowing the assessment of punitive damages in drunken driving
cases favor the term "conscious desregard" to describe the de-
fendant's conduct, while states disallowing the imposition of puni-
tive damages have taken an affinity to the term "malice" and the
stricter more conservative application the term normally engen-
ders .60
But, as we have seen, a party may not realize that he is invading the
rights of another, yet his conduct may be such that a person of ordinary
prudence and reason would say that it constitutes a reckless disregard of
the rights of others. In such a case the jury would be justified in awarding
punitive damages.
Id. at 225, 112 S.E. at 428. But see, Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 70 S.E.2d 629
(1952). See also, cases cited in note 2 supra.
56. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 205; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 10.
57. E.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962)
("malice" under Florida privacy law); Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir.
1961) (Hawaii uses the terms "willful, oppressive, or wanton commission of a tort
"spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations"); State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d 837 (1971) ('reckless acts of
spite or ill will"); Nance v. Cook, 240 Ark. 336, 399 S.W.2d 262 (1966) ("wanton dis-
regard of the rights and safety of others"); Cotton v. Fisheries Products Co., 181
N.C. 151, 106 S.E. 487 (1921) ("malicious, wanton, and reckless manner," "reckless
and criminal indifference to plaintiff's rights"); Cooperative Ref. Assn. v. Young,
393 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1964) ("fraud, malice or oppression," "evil intent").
58. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 205-6.
59. See note 7 supra.
60. See generally cases cited note 7 supra.
C. The Advantages of Punitive Damages
Legal scholars who have embroiled themselves in the ongoing
controversy surrounding the use of exemplary damages have iso-
lated what they perceive to be the doctrine's strengths and weak-
nesses. 61 While the determination of what is an advantage or
disadvantage to the use of punitive damages is clearly a subjec-
tive matter, with certain aspects of the doctrine sharing both de-
scriptions positive and negative qualities, it can be safely stated
that punitive damages do not present any strengths or weak-
nesses unique to drunken driving. Nevertheless, an analysis of
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of punitive damages
will show the benefit that the public can expect to gain as well as
the risks that the tortfeasor may expect to encounter.
The most commonly noted advantage to the utilization of puni-
tive damages has been that of deterrence. 62 The doctrine's oppo-
nents also cite deterrence, or the lack thereof, as its principal
disadvantage. 63 Proponents of punitive damages suggest that the
average juror is aware of the theory of punitive damages.64 Crit-
ics, to the contrary, argue that most people are ignorant of puni-
tive damages; they argue that the public has undergone a
sociological orientation to enjoy liquor and then drive. Critics be-
lieve the high incidence of undetected drunk driving and the
drunken driver's inability to rationally choose to drive once he
has become intoxicated effectively undermine the argument that
punitive damages deter.65
In order to resolve this debate, a strong analogy may be drawn
between punitive damages and penal laws. Based on the recidi-
vism rates of offenders, many argue that our penal laws fail to de-
ter criminal conduct. Similarly, critics urge that the high
incidence of drunken driving clearly establishes that punitive
damages lack any deterrence value. The counter argument is that
such conclusions are erroneous or, at a minimum, biased and in-
complete. One can not focus on a minority's failure to abide by a
certain rule and use this as a basis to conclude that the majority
also is not deterred by existing sanctions.66
61. See note 25 supra.
62. C. McCORMICK, supra note 8, § 77, at 276, D. DOBBS, supra, note 10, § 3.9, at
205, 220.
63. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 220. See also, DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969).
64. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J.
216, 226 (1960); Why Everybody is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Dec. 4, 1978, at 54.
65. See generally, DRINKING, supra note 2.
66. There is simply no statistical method of ferreting out those who are de-
terred by criminal sanctions or punitive damages; this section of the population is
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Another argument is that punitive damages have no greater de-
terrent value than actual or compensatory damages. However,
this overlooks the fact that punitive damages probably serve as a
greater deterrent because they can not be absolved through bank-
ruptcy,67 and in many states are uninsurable. 68 Another principal
advantage inherent in the use of punitive damages that relates di-
rectly to drunken driving is that they punish wrongs rarely prose-
cuted.69 Punitive damages are best suited for those wrongs that
are theoretically punishable, but which in actuality go unnoticed
or are ignored by prosecutors who are preoccupied with more se-
rious crimes. 70 Until recently, drunken driving was not as dili-
gently prosecuted as other crimes, and the defendant was often
given only a suspended sentence or sent to traffic school.71 Obvi-
ously, where a drunken driver is involved in an accident involving
serious injury or death, prosecution usually results. Punitive
damages, however, provide a would-be plaintiff with far more in-
centive to bring suit in the minor case, such as where a collision
occurs involving only slight property damage. An innocuous re-
sult, such as a bent fender, does not and should not immunize the
drunken driver from being punished for his wrongful conduct.72
Other advantages routinely espoused in support of punitive
damages include the following: that they combine public law en-
forcement with private vengeance, thus discouraging the lawless-
ness of self-help; 73 they cover actual expenses not covered by
undetectable and therefore immeasurable. Since this large but statistically elu-
sive portion of the population is an indispensable factor to any analysis attempting
to determine the validity or invalidity of the deterrent value of exemplary dam-
ages or penal laws, such an analysis is necessarily incomplete. Consequently, any
conclusions drawn from that partial analysis are conjectural. Both the doctrine's
critics and supporters argue that the other should prove either the viability or
non-viability of the doctrine's deterrent value. Whoever is forced to carry this bur-
den of proof will fail.
67. See, e.g., U.S. Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Digoras, 169 Cal. App. 2d 673, 337 P.2d
866 (1959); Morris v. Drubin, 165 Cal. App. 467, 332 P.2d 371 (1959); O'Brien v. Ap-
pling, 133 Cal. App. 2d 40, 283 P.2d 289 (1955).
68. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972).
69. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 77, at 276; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2,
at 11.
70. Id.
71. Supra note 2.
72. Of course, the prerequisite of compensatory damages must still be met.
73. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 205. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 77,
at 277; Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Re-evaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
431, 133 (1976). This has been labeled the "private attorney general" argument.
compensatory damages such as attorney's fees and court costs; 74
and they allow the caprice of the jury to be reduced and its anger
vented.7 5
D. The Disadvantages of Punitive Damages
Of the numerous criticisms that have been levied against the
doctrine of punitive damages, perhaps the most strongly voiced
has been that punitive damages contravene the rule against
double jeopardy 76 and violate the spirit if not the letter of the
Constitution.7 7 A defendant may be held liable for punitive dam-
ages irrespective of any prior or subsequent criminal proceeding,
thereby moving some critics to claim that the defendant is pun-
ished twice for the same offense. 78 Proponents of punitive dam-
ages counter this criticism by noting that, while constitutional
immunity from double jeopardy is not limited solely to threats to
life or limb,79 it does seem clearly limited to criminal proceed-
ings.80 Proponents further point out that the prohibition against
double jeopardy was taken from English law, which allowed puni-
tive damages. This occurred before the United States Constitu-
tion was adopted in 1789.81
A second disadvantage cited by critics of punitive damages is
that such damages ignore significant procedural safeguards such
as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 82 Supporters of punitive damages at-
tempt to circumvent the deprivation of these particular procedu-
ral safeguards by enumerating the safeguards that are available
to a defendant. Proponents urge that "the verdict may be twice
submitted by the complaining defendant to the common sense of
trained judicial minds, once on motion for new trial and again on
appeal, and it must be a rare instance when an unjustifiable
74. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 205; C. McCoaMIcK, supra note 10, § 77, at
277; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 11; see also Smith v. Dunaway, 77 Ill. App.
2d 1, 5, 221 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1966); Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564, 568, 75 N.W. 482, 483
(1898); Brewer v. Homestake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96, 98-9, 434 P.2d 828, 831 (1967);
Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 556, 230 P.2d 328, 329 (1951). Contra International Elec.
Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Prod. Co., 370 Pa. 213, 225, 88 A.2d 40, 46 (1952).
75. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 220.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 77, at 276, W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2,
at 11.
78. The doctrine of punitive damages has nevertheless been held to be consti-
tutional. See note 27, supra and accompanying text.
79. In other words, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
guards against even trivial prosecutions, such as receiving two parking tickets for
the same violation.
80. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 77, at 277.
81. Id.
82. Id.; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 11.
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award escapes corrections."8 3 Therefore, it is readily apparent
that the drunken driver is in a considerably stronger position pro-
cedurally within a civil context, than he is within a criminal one.
Other criticisms directed against the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages have been that they are limited solely by the passion,
prejudice, and caprice of the jury;8 4 damages are an undeserved
windfall;8 5 twisted to buttress an inadequate compensatory dam-
ages system; 86 and finally, as alluded to earlier, punitive damages
serve no deterrent function.8 7
Whatever one's opinion may be respecting punitive damages
the odds are remote, based on their widespread popularity and
use, that they will be abolished in the forseeable future. The
practitioner is simply advised to develop a sufficient grasp of pu-
nitive damages in order that he may best represent his client, ei-
ther by pursuing or defending against such damages. With this
background on punitive damages in mind, case law from the vari-
ous states that have addressed the issue of whether, and under
what circumstances, a drunken driver may be held liable for puni-
tive damages, will now be scrutinized.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
Of the twenty-five 8  jurisdictions that have addressed the issue
of whether or not a drunken driver may be held liable for punitive
damages, eighteen8 9 have either expressly ruled without reserva-
tion in favor of punishing drunken drivers,90 or have done so sub-
ject to certain restrictions. 91 The remaining seven jurisdictions92
83. C. McCoRmIcK, supra note 10, § 77, at 278.
84. Id., at 276; D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 219; W. PROSSER, supra note 12,
§ 2, at 11.
85. C. McCoRmiCK, supra note 10, § 77 at 276; D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at
219; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 11.
86. See Note, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Re-evaluation, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 431, 443-45 (1976).
87. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 220.
88. See note 7 supra.
89. The eighteen states that have allowed the imposition of punitive damages
against drunken drivers are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
90. Two of the eighteen states have very liberal views on punishing drunken
drivers with punitive damages. They are Florida (Ingram v. Petit, 340 So. 2d 922
(Fla. 1976) and New Mexico (Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 487 P.2d 167
(1971)).
91. The principal restriction alluded to is that there exists the traditional pre-
have not ruled, as a matter of law, that punitive damages may not
be assessed against drunken drivers, but have imposed such a
strict burden of proof upon those requesting exemplary damages
that, for all practical purposes, they are effectively precluded.93
Decisions from those states allowing the imposition of punitive
damages will be scrutinized in order to determine the underlying
reasons those courts have ruled as they have. This analysis will
be followed by a study of cases from states that, in light of practi-
cal considerations, have denied punitive damages. Finally, the re-
cent California decision of Taylor v. Superior Court94 will be
examined.
A. Jurisdictions Approving the Assessment of Punitive Damages
Against Drunken Drivers
Unfortunately, judicial reasoning given for holding drunken
drivers liable for punitive damages has not been entirely consis-
tent. Older decisions summarily granted punitive damages with-
out analysis and on the apparent assumption that the facts alone
justified their imposition.95 Other more recent decisions have
adopted an extreme position and maintained that evidence of in-
toxication alone is conclusive proof of the conduct which justifies
the application of punitive damages. 96 The majority of decisions,
however, have followed a more moderate approach and have al-
lowed the imposition of exemplary damages by emphasizing the
"conscious disregard" element, to the almost virtual exclusion of
requisites to the assessment of punitive damages, particularly that of causation; a
nexus must be established between the defendant's wrongful conduct and his in-
toxication.
92. The seven jurisdictions that consist of the minority are: District of Colum-
bia, Kansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. The Dis-
trict of Columbia case that addressed the issue is Giddings v. Zellan, 160 F.2d 585
(D.C. Cir. 1947). Giddings applied Maryland law as a result of a conflict in that
particular case. Thus, it is clear that the District of Columbia in future cases
would apply the opposite rules where applicable.
93. It will be subsequently established that the primary cause of this in-
creased burden of proof upon plaintiffs requesting damages is the terminology and
the problems that are concurrent with that terminology. Minority jurisdictions
favor the term "malice" which requires the implication of a highly particularized
state of mind.
94. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
95. A number of older cases follow that have held defendant motorists liable
for punitive damages without a thorough analysis of the rationale: Chitwood v.
Stoner, 60 Ga. App. 599, 4 S.E.2d 605 (1939); Madison v. Wigal, 18 InI. App. 2d 564,
153 N.E.2d 90 (1950); Wiggington's Adm'r v. Rickert, 186 Ky. 650, 217 S.W. 933
(1920); Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951);
Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P.2d 964 (1952); compare Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz.
60, 274 P. 639 (1929) with Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977); Pratt
v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945).
96. See cases cited note 90 supra.
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other terms. 97
The first of these latter cases was Miller v. Blanton.98 The Ar-
kansas court, in discounting the need for malice or wilfulness, im-
plicitly stated that all of the traditional prerequisites to punitive
damages were not collectively required, but that any one element
or a combination thereof would suffice. 99 The Miller court enunci-
ated the sole element it considered important when it espoused
the following:
When Miller imbibed alcoholic liquor he knew he was taking into his
stomach a substance that would stupify his senses, retard his muscle and
nervous reaction, and impair, if not destroy, the perfect co-ordination of
eye, brain and muscles that is essential to safe driving. After Miller volun-
tarily rendered himself unfit to operate a car properly he undertook to
drive his automobile, a potentially lethal machine, down a well traveled
highway. His conduct in doing that was distinctly anti-social, and the jury
was amply authorized in saying by their verdict that he was exhibiting a
"wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others." 10 0
Thus, Miller is clearly of that genre of cases that place primary
emphasis on the defendant's conduct, and which subsequently
impute a state of mind they believe to be consistent with that
conduct. Here, the court concentrated on Miller's actions of
drinking until he was physically unfit to drive and subsequently
driving with impaired faculties. The court concluded he had vol-
untarily made himself an extremely dangerous person to the po-
tential harm of everyone. This conduct became the foundation
upon which the court placed its finding that Miller acted in wan-
ton disregard to the rights and safety of the general public. Most
jurisdictions which allow punitive damages have followed these
same reasons.' 0 ' While few dispute the soundness of these deci-
sions, they are, in a sense, incomplete and potentially confusing.
The majority of these decisions have implicitly accepted the re-
quirement of causation. It must be remembered that punitive
damages may be imposed only after establishing that the defend-
ant's intoxication was the cause of the accident.10 2 To allow the
97. See notes 7, 89 supra.
98. 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948).
99. Id. at 248-49, 210 S.W.2d at 294.
100. Id. at 249, 210 S.W.2d at 294-95.
101. See note 89 supra.
102. This is not necessarily as easy to accomplish as may appear at first glance.
It would be possible for a drunken driver to commit a negligent act in such a man-
ner as to not indicate intoxication. For example, a drunken driver could be well
within the speed limit, drive a straight line and have a rear-end collision with a car
stopped at an intersection. Rear-end collisions are very common and are mostly
due to inattention, not intoxication. In such an instance, it is extremely unlikely
assessment of exemplary damages on the evidence of intoxication
alone would be arguably unconstitutional as it would be punish-
ing the defendant simply because he was drunk. 103 Admittedly,
causality will usually be so obvious that an analysis of it may be
summarily conducted. Nevertheless, it is essential to force the
plaintiff to present a prima facie case. The causality requirement
would play a prominent role in those rare instances where a de-
fendant's intoxication has a nominal or completely immaterial im-
pact on the causation of an accident.1 0 4
The Wisconsin decision of Ayala v. Farmer's Mut. Auto. Ins.,
Co. 105 gave a definitive explanation of the balance that must be
struck between evidence of intoxication and proof that such in-
toxication had a marked effect in producing a given accident.
Intoxication, standing by itself, does not constitute either gross negli-
gence or ordinary negligence. While a person's driving of a motor vehicle
when intoxicated, is prohibited by statute, and is a criminal offense, never-
theless, an intoxicated driver of a motor vehicle may become involved in a
collision and yet be free from negligence, and, therefore, not liable to re-
spond in damages . . . . However, when there is concurrence of intoxica-
tion and causal negligence as to items such as speed, management and
control, position of the highway, lookout, etc., the same constitutes gross
negligence.'
0 6
According to this explanation, intoxication may become the ba-
sis for exemplary damages if the evidence of intoxication addi-
tionally manifests itself circumstantially107 through the
one could get punitive damages and it is arguable that one should not. See
Zylman, Hostile Drivers and Alcohol Don't Mix, TRIAL, Oct. 1976, at 60.
103. To assess punitive damages against a drunken driver without having es-
tablished a causal connection between the collision and the defendant's intoxica-
tion would be tantamount to punishing the defendant because he was drunk,
which arguably would make him a status offender. Under the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), it is uncon-
stitutional to punish a person solely for being an alcoholic. DRINKING, supra note
2, at 317. However, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968), the fact that a person is an alcoholic does not absolve him or her
from liability for criminal acts while in an intoxicated state. Appellant was con-
victed not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a
particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere sta-
tus, as California did in Robinson; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant's be-
havior in the privacy of his own home. Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a
criminal sanction for public behavior which may create substantial health and
safety hazards, both for appellant and for members of the general public, and
which offends the moral and esthetic sensibilities of a large segment of the com-
munity. Id. at 532. For a general discussion of both the Robinson and Powell deci-
sions, see DRINKING, supra note 2, at 316-20.
104. Supra, note 102.
105. 272 Wis. 629, 76 N.W.2d 563 (1956).
106. Id. at 640, 76 N.W.2d at 570 (citation omitted).
107. Direct evidence as opposed to circumstantial evidence, that would estab-
lish intoxication is the various chemical tests that law enforcement officials admin-
ister, such as breathanalyzer tests. Most jurisdictions hold that a blood-alcohol
content of .10% is legal, and most states also hold that violation of that statute is
negligence per se. See e.g., CAL. VEH. CODR 23126(a)(3) (West 1971).
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defendant's erratic or abnormal driving. In effect, the Ayala
court, as well as others, rely on the logical syllogism that intoxica-
tion impairs the senses; 0 8 impaired senses lead to irregular and
dangerous driving; irregular and dangerous driving leads to colli-
sions. This is fundamentally sound logic that achieves two dis-
tinct objectives. First, it forces the plaintiff to present a prima
facie case, which will not always be easily accomplished. Second,
it serves as a protective measure in those instances where a
drunken driver is innocent of any causation respecting a collision.
An example of this would occur where a drunken driver reacts to
an impending collision as a negligent non-intoxicated driver
would react. This second point prevents a drunken driver and his
insurer from being held strictly liable for a collision simply be-
cause of intoxication.
A more recent decision to echo this same concern is Focht v.
Rabada.10 9 In Focht, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania indi-
cated that, "driving while under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor with its very great potential for harm and serious injury may
under certain circumstances be deemed 'outrageous conduct' and
a 'reckless indifference to the interest of others' sufficient to allow
the imposition of punitive damages."" 0 Therefore, this court also
recognized that despite a defendant's intoxication, circumstances
would have to be present which warranted submission of the pu-
nitive damages issue to a jury.
The Focht court similarly reflected concerns expressed by other
courts as well. It proposed that a defendant's "misconduct may
be established without reference to motive or intent""' in deter-
108. However, legal intoxication, as prescribed by statute, may not necessarily
indicate that the defendant motorist had so dull d his senses as to be incapable of
driving competently. Some alcoholics have sueh a high resistance to alcohol that
they remain essentially unimpaired, even though their blood-alcohol content may
be considerably higher than .10%. See Zylman, Hostile Drivers and Alcohol Don't
Mix, TRiAL Oct. 1976, at 60. The alcoholic should not be given the benefit of the
doubt, however, and should be found negligent if violation of the applicable stat-
ute is viewed as negligence per se.
But, in the context of actual and punitive damages, one should not be liable be-
cause his blood-alcohol content is higher than that allowed by statute; rather, the
plaintiff should be required to demonstrate that the defendant's negligent conduct
was a direct result of his drinking. In the vast majority of cases this will be easily
accomplished.
109. 217 Pa. Sup. Ct. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970); accord, Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183,
508 P.2d 211 (1973).
110. 217 Pa. Sup. Ct. at 40, 268 A.2d at 158.
111. Id. at 41, 268 A.2d at 161.
mining whether or not he acted with reckless indifference. Again,
the implication is clear that many of the courts within majority ju-
risdictions are willing to examine only the defendant's conduct
and ignore his mental state in order to determine the propriety of
imposing exemplary damages. However, the court took a moder-
ate position when it noted that "malice" was still an element that
necessarily involved the requisite mental state,112 and the "con-
scious disregard" test was the applicable standard.
A few of the jurisdictions that presently allow the imposition of
exemplary damages against drunken drivers have engaged in rea-
soning so liberal that they may be considered extreme in the posi-
tions that they have taken.113 A recent case that best exemplifies
this is the Florida decision of Ingram v. Petit.14 In a somewhat
haphazard opinion the Ingram court held that a drunken driver
could be held liable for punitive damages:
[WIithout regard to external proof of carelessness or abnormal driving,
provided always the traditional elements for punitive liability are proved,
including proximate causation and an underlying award of compensatory
damages. We do not hold that intoxication coupled with negligence will
always justify an award of punitive damages. We affirmatively hold that
the voluntary act of driving "while intoxicated" evinces, without more a
sufficiently reckless attitude 1 15 for a jury to be asked to provide an award
of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensatory dam-
ages. 1 1
6
This statement, replete with inherent contradictions and incon-
sistencies, indicates the Ingram Court was marching to two differ-
ent drummers. On the one hand, the court emphasizes the need
for causation, but on the other hand, says proof of intoxication"17
112. Id.
113. Malice is the term minority jurisdictions have emphasized. See note 51
supra.
114. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976). See also, Note, Negligent Intoxicated Driver Lia-
ble for Punitive Damages Without Proof of Abnormal or Reckless Driving, 6 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 221 (1978).
115. Justice Sundberg, in his dissent, stated, "I suggest that the law of torts as
it has been carefully developed over the years permits an award of punitive dam-
ages in personal injury cases involving vehicles where reckless conduct is in-
volved, not reckless attitude." 340 So. 2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
117. Based on the facts of Ingram, it is clear what drummer the majority is
marching to. The facts, as stated by the court, were:
The record in this case indicates that Ingram's car was hit by Pettit from
the rear while standing at an intersection in a well-lit area. Pettit's car
had not been moving at an excessive rate of speed, and it had not been
seen to swerve or veer outside the marked lines of traffic. In fact, except
for conflicting evidence as to whether Pettit applied his brakes before his
vehicle struck Ingram's, there was no indication that the operation of Pet-
tit's car up to the time of the accident was other than normal. This acci-
dent is before us solely because Pettit submitted to a breathalyzer test
which showed his blood-alcohol content to be .26% on a scale where the
legal presumption of intoxication arises at .10%.
Id. at 923.
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"without more" is a sufficient justification for imposing exemplary
damages. Since the defendant's negligence in Ingram was never
attributed to his intoxication,'"8 and was of the same character
that a non-intoxicated driver may have exhibited, 119 evidently the
court's real intention was to deter120 the drunken driver at any
cost, including holding him strictly accountable for any mishap in
which he is involved.
The scathing dissent in Ingram was quick to point out the legal
contortions the majority had performed.' 2' Justice Sundberg cor-
rectly indicated that the majority was holding a defendant motor-
ist strictly liable based solely on evidence of his intoxication. 22
He further added that, "[t]he intoxicated driver becomes an in-
surer, to the full extent of punitive damages, irrespective of any
showing that his conduct in the operation of the automobile fell
below that standard of care which is expected of a reasonable,
prudent man under similar circumstances."123 Justice Sundberg
This is identical to the hypothetical given earlier exemplifying a situation where
punitive damages probably should not be given. See note 108 supra. Thus, it
seems that in Florida, intoxication alone is sufficient.
118. 340 So. 2d at 923.
119. Id.
120. The Ingram court felt that the Florida Legislature "evolved the notion that
drunk drivers menace the public safety and are to be discouraged by punish-
ment." Id. at 924.
121. Id. at 926 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
122. Id. accord, Smith v. Chapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977). In Smith,
the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
We disagree, however, with that court's legal opinion that "intoxication
plus negligent driving equals reckless disregard for the safety and rights
of others," under all circumstances. The law of torts does not permit such
a sweeping inference; it eliminates the necessity of showing proximate
cause and makes a driver, who has had some alcoholic beverage previous
to driving, an insurer in strict liability for punitive damages, whether or
not the consumption of alcohol has anything whatever to do with a subse-
quent accident.
115 Ariz. at 214, 564 P.2d at 903.
123. 340 So. 2d at 924 (emphasis in original). Justice Sundberg also noted:
The majority opinion extends the strict liability concept to the recovery of
punitive damages, but says that the traditional elements such as proxi-
mate causation and an underlying award of compensatory damages must
still be proved. But what does this mean-that the accident caused injury
or that the intoxication, without more, caused the accident to occur? If the
latter, then the position is untenable in a situation such as we have at bar
where there is no evidence at all that the intoxication caused any irregu-
larities in the operation of the vehicle. If the former, then notwithstanding
the lip service paid to it, the concept of proximate causation has gone by
the boards.
Id. at 926 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
carefully discussed the ultimate purpose of tort law, 124 and con-
cluded that the majority had twisted this purpose and had "elimi-
nated even the necessity for a single separate act of simple
negligence where evidence of intoxication is present."'125
This sampling of cases from those jurisdictions that permit the
assessment of punitive damages against drunken drivers estab-
lishes a predilection for such terms as "conscious disregard," to
the literal exclusion of other descriptive terms. The term chosen
by the majority of the states does not carry an easy burden of
presenting a prima facie case, but those courts have liberalized
the term's application. Their willingness to exclusively limit
themselves to an examination of the defendant's conduct, de-em-
phasized direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind. The
majority view avoids other definitions such as "malicious"126 or
"wicked,"127 which, most would agree, carry the requisite state of
mind, and which are distinctly favored by the minority jurisdic-
tions. Based on the foregoing analysis, practitioners seeking ex-
emplary damages would be well advised to use the appropriate
language and plead every feasible factual argument that fulfills
the syllogism that the majority viewpoint implicitly relies upon.
B. Jurisdiction Disapproving128 the Assessment of Punitive
Damages Against Drunken Drivers
Of the states that have addressed the issue of whether punitive
damages may be applied against drunken drivers, only seven to
date have responded in the negative. 29 These states have not re-
fused to impose exemplary damages on ideological grounds.
Rather, their refusal has been predicated upon an extremely
strict definitional framework which has been imposed on those
seeking punitive damages. As indicated earlier, the minority of
states have placed great credence in the term "malice" and the
concurrent burden of proof the term carries. These states require
124. Classically, in the law of torts, it is substandard conduct in the per-
formance or nonperformance of an act which subjects the actor to liability
for compensatory damages. If the conduct of an individual in operating an
automobile is not otherwise substandard, evidence of intoxication on the
part of that individual, in and of itself, logically cannot convert the con-
duct into a category which will permit recovery of punitive damages with-
out totally emasculating the principle of proximate causation.
Id.
125. Id. at 927.
126. See note 52 supra.
127. See note 90 supra.
128. This term is used for lack of a better term. These jurisdictions have not
conclusively disapproved the assessment of punitive damages against drunken
drivers in their respective states. Rather, the term is meant to imply that no case
has yet been filed wherein "malice" exists to the court's satisfaction.
129. See note 92 supra.
[Vol. 8: 117, 1980] Punitive Damages
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that the plaintiff plead and prove the requisite state of mind mal-
ice implies, independent of the defendant's conduct. Even under
a more traditional setting and circumstances, this is an onerous
burden of proof. But modern considerations such as those in-
volved in drunk driving do not fit easily, if at all, under the anach-
ronistic framework set forth by the term "malice." Proving malice
outside the context of conduct is almost futile in drunken driving
cases, thus the burden of proof will rarely be met.130 Therefore,
from a practical standpoint, punitive damages are effectively pre-
cluded by these minority jurisdictions.
This fondness for the term "malice" and the requirements ac-
companying it, were outlined by the Virginia high court in the de-
cision of Baker v. Marcus.'3 ' The court mentioned several
common law descriptions that have traditionally been the basis
for the imposition of punitive damages, 132 but demonstrated its
inclination toward the term malice when it stated:
One who knowingly drives his automobile on the highway under the in-
fluence of intoxicants, in violation of statute, is, of course, negligent. It is a
wrong, reckless and unlawful thing to do; but it is not necessarily a mali-
cious act. Evidence may be offered to show the negligence of a driver; but
in the absence of proof of one or more of the elements necessary to justify
an award of punitive damages, it may not be used to enlarge an award of
damages beyond that which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the in-
jury suffered. 13 3
The Baker court reflected its concern for the defendant's
mental state when they indicated she had shown "no motive" to
injure the plaintiff nor demonstrated any "ill will" toward him.134
Most decisions from the minority view point have decided the is-
sue of punitive damages in drunk driving cases in a similar man-
ner to that of the Baker court. 35
130. See note 92, 93 supra and accompanying text.
131. 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (1960). It must be noted that factual proof of the
defendant's intoxication in this case was weak and very probably played a role in
the court's decision. Id. at 114 S.E.2d at 906. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the
court would have ruled as it did even if the evidence had been stronger based on
the court's substantive position on the issue.
132. Id. at 909, 114 S.E.2d at 620-21.
133. Id. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621 (emphasis added).
134. See note 131 supra.
135. See note 89 supra. Cf., Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E.2d 74
(1970). In Brake the term "recklessness" implied intentional, and inferred that pu-
nitive damages were only recoverable where there was an intent to injure. Under
this view, one would not wish to seek punitive damages because in the event they
were proved, the defendant's carrier would be able to absolve itself of any
financial responsibility, based on the common public policy of refusing to insure
The Kansas decision of Gesslein v. Britton136 also summarized
the considerable burden placed on plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages in these minority jurisdictions. The court initially made
reference to the numerous adjectives used to describe the con-
duct that is a prerequisite to the imposition of punitive damages
and correctly pointed out that they were mere conclusions that
must be proven by the facts of the case. 137 The Gesslein court
then engaged in a sophistic attack on the plaintiff's pleadings by
arguing:
[NI o one condones the act of driving an automobile while under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor, but, that is not the question here. Nowhere
does plaintiff allege that the defendant's being under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor caused him to drive on the wrong side of the road,
caused him to fail to give a warning or signal his intention to turn, and
caused him not to have his vehicle under proper control.
1 38
The court's statement has two principal weaknesses. First, it
seems abundantly clear the defendant's intoxication caused him
to drive in the erratic manner the court described; it is rare when
a non-intoxicated individual will drive in the manner described.
Second, even excluding evidence of intoxication, the defendant's
conduct alone, such as driving on the wrong side of the road,
surely justifies being labeled reckless and in conscious disregard
of the rights and safety of others. Even licensed drivers of low in-
tellect and little common sense are aware of the dangers posed by
such driving. The dissent in Gesslein found it difficult to conceive
of a better case where there were facts of wanton, reckless behav-
ior.139
against intentional torts. See also Note, The Drinking Driver and Punitive Dam-
ages, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 528 (1971).
136. 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954).
137. Id. at 664, 266 P.2d at 265.
138. Id. The plaintiff in Gesslein plead four counts of negligence, the fourth of
which was the defendant's intoxication. The court criticized the plaintiff's com-
plaint and said he had failed to connect the defendant's conduct with his intoxica-
tion. This is not quite true as the plaintiff's fourth allegation indicates:
4. Defendant was guilty of negligence in the operation of said automobile
as follows:
(a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor, defendant at said
time and place drove his automobile in violation of and contrary to
G.S. 1949, 8-530.
(b) In failing to drive said automobile on the right or East half of said
highway as provided by G.S. 1949, 8-537 and in violation of said statute.
(c) In failing to give a signal of intention to turn left continuously for
100 feet prior to the turning of his automobile as provided by G.S. 1949,
8-547 and in violation of said statute.
(d) In failing to have said automobile under proper control so as to
have avoided turning said automobile to the left to the wrong side of
the highway and into the path of and into the automobile in which
plaintiff was riding.
Id. at 662, 266 P.2d at 264. It seems clear that the courts disgruntlement with this
particular case runs much deeper than a mere dissatisfaction with the pleadings.
139. Id. at 666, 266 P.2d at 266-67 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Despite the conduct in Gesslein being of such a reckless charac-
ter, with or without evidence of intoxication, the majority of the
court immersed itself in an incredibly technical and literally spe-
cious discussion of what a plaintiff must plead and prove before
submitting the issue of exemplary damage to the jury. Therefore,
it again seems clear punitive damages will rarely be given in
these minority of jurisdictions.
The examination of these selected cases, representative of mi-
nority states, outlines the tremendous uphill battle facing plain-
tiff's attorneys in their quest for exemplary damages. Where
possible, they should attempt to prove actual malice,o40 even
though the minority decisions state in dictum that malice can be
implied by a wrongful act.141 Moreover, the practitioner should
carefully cultivate in his pleadings every conceivable factual
nexus between the defendant's intoxication and his driving.
Lastly, in the minority states, the practitioner is cautioned to use
terms that imply intent very wisely, and sparingly because should
he successfully prove the defendant intentionally caused the
plaintiffs injuries, he may find himself without the insurance that
normally covers compensatory damages.
C. California's Position
Punitive damages in California are a creature of statute.142 His-
torically, the courts have been extremely conservative in their ap-
plication of the statutory language controlling exemplary
damages, and for many years this class of money damages was
not feasible against drunken drivers.143 Recently, the California
140. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 863 (5th ed. 1979).
141. See definition of legal malice, id. at 806.
142. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) which provides that: "In an action for
the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in ad-
dition to actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant." See note 29 supra.
143. In California, the issue of whether or not a drunken driver could be held
liable to an injured party for punitive damages was first addressed in the case of
Strauss v. Buckley, 20 Cal. App. 2d 7, 65 P.2d 1352 (1937). Twenty-one years follow-
ing the Strauss decision, the case of Gombos v. Ahse, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d
933 (1958) was decided. Agreeing with the position taken by a minority of jurisdic-
tions, Gombos held:
[T] he mere characterization of the conduct challenged as wilful, reckless,
wrongful and unlawful is not in itself sufficient to charge the malice in fact
required to sustain a cause of action for punitive damages ... (158 Cal.
App. 2d at 529, 322 P.2d at 940) .... One who becomes intoxicated, know-
Supreme Court removed this barrier in the case of Taylor v. Supe-
rior Court,4 4 holding that, under certain circumstances, a
drunken driver may be held liable for punitive damages.
Justice Richardson, who wrote the majority opinion,145 defined
the issue before the court as "whether punitive damages (Civ.
Code, § 3294) are recoverable in a personal injury action brought
against the intoxicated driver."146 After noting the allegations147
charged against the defendant, the majority concentrated its ef-
forts on defining and applying the "malice" element of section
3294 of the California Civil Code. The court defined malice, which
is the only element of the statute remotely relevant to a drunk
driving context, as a term which "implies an act conceived in a
spirit of mischief or with criminal indifference towards the obliga-
tions owed to others.' 4 8
Following its discussion of section 3294, the majority jumped
into the definitional fray surrounding the term "malice," which
has caused extensive divisiveness among the states attempting to
define and apply it. The court noted that the defendant's success-
ing that he intends to drive his automobile on the highway, is of course
negligent, and perhaps grossly negligent. It is a reckless and wrongful and
illegal thing to do. But it is not a malicious act. (158 Cal. App. 2d at 527,
322 P.2d at 940).
For an interesting but limited discussion of the case law that led up to the deci-
sion in Taylor v. Superior Court, see Fernandez, Punitive Damages and the Intoxi-
cated Driver: An Approach to Taylor v. Superior Court, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 307
(1979). This article is not helpful with the analysis of Taylor because it was pub-
lished before that decision was announced.
144. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979). The court did not
grant punitive damages, but merely held the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action for these damages.
145. The majority consisted of Justices Richardson, Tobriner, Mosk, and Ma-
nuel. Chief Justice Bird concurred in part and dissented in part, with Justices
Newman and Clark concurring with her opinion. Justice Clark filed the sole dis-
senting opinion.
146. 24 Cal. 3d at 892, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
147. The allegations leveled against defendant Stille were:
1) That he had previously caused a serious automobile accident while
driving under the influence of alcohol; 2) That he had been arrested and
convicted for drunk driving on numerous prior occasions; 3) That at the
time of the accident herein, Stille had recently completed a probationary
period following a drunk driving conviction; 4) That one of the conditions
of Stille's probation was that he refrain from consuming any alcoholic bev-
erage at least six hours before driving; 5) That at the time the accident
herein occurred, Stille was facing a pending criminal drunk driving
charge; 6) That Stille accepted employment as a liquor salesman which re-
quired him to transport alcoholic beverages in his car to various commer-
cial establishments; and 7) That at the time the accident occurred, Stille
was transporting alcoholic beverages while intoxicated. Id. at 893, 598 P.2d
at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
148. Id. at 894, 598 P.2d at 855, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695, quoting from Ebaugh v. Ras-
kin. 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972). The court also noted mal-
ice in fact was sufficient, as opposed to the legal malice described and that this
could also be established circumstantially.
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ful demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint at the trial level request-
ing exemplary damages had been premised on the plaintiff's
failure to plead an actual intent to harm others.149 The court
quickly rejected the argument that actual intent is imperative to
the imposition of punitive damages, recognizing that both
respected legal scholars,o5 0 and its own recent decisions have held
such damages may be assessed where the defendant acted "with
the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard
of the plaintiffs rights.'51 The court further buttressed this point
by concurring with the recent case of G.D. Searle & Co. v. Supe-
rior Court152 respecting that decision's treatment of "conscious
disregard"'5 3 which stated that, "in order to justify an award of
punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous conse-
quences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately
failed to avoid those consequences."154
This passage in Taylor is especially significant because it pre-
cisely states the court's position on the crucial issue of the de-
fendant's state of mind. Under this definition of "conscious
disregard," one need not engage in the potentially self-defeating
effort of establishing actual intent to injure on the part of the de-
fendant and also need not be hampered by the cumbersome bur-
den of proof peculiar to the term "malice." In compelling the
defendant to demonstrate a state of mind wherein the defendant
possessed an awareness of the probable consequences of his con-
duct, the majority in Taylor created a moderating influence be-
tween the majority decisions which have suggested intoxication,
in itself, is sufficient for punitive damages and those opposite
cases in minority jurisdictions that would burden plaintiffs with
149. Id. at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
150. The court cited W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2, at 9-10.
151. 24 Cal. 3d at 895, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (emphasis in original).
The court cited Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 582 P.2d 980, 986,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 (1978); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462,
521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1977); Seiman v. Southern Pac. Transportation
Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607, 136 Cal. Rptr. 787, 791 (1977); G.D. Sourle & Co. v. Sup.
Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 29-30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1975).
152. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
153. '"The phrase conscious disregard is sometimes used to describe the highly
culpable state of mind which justifies an exemplary award .... We suggest con-
scious disregard of safety as an appropriate description of the animus malus
which may justify an exemplary award when non-deliberate injury is alleged." Id.
at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (emphasis in original).
154. 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
the cross of an anachronistic definition. To be sure, the majority
in Taylor did not urge that the defendant's state of mind must be
established independent of his conduct; but rather, that the plain-
tiff must plead and prove the requisite mental state, and that he
may do so circumstantially through conduct if necessary.X55 This
modifying approach taken by the majority in Taylor assures jus-
tice to both litigants in a drunk driving case. The plaintiff is not
crushed with an impossible burden of proof, and the defendant is
protected because the plaintiff must establish that he knew of the
dangerous circumstances his conduct created, a burden not easily
achieved.
The majority in Taylor noticed the factual similarity with its
predecessor Gombos v. Ashe,156 which held against punitive dam-
ages. The plaintiff in Taylor tried to distinguish that similarity. 15 7
The majority agreed with the plaintiff and imposed punitive dam-
ages, but cautioned that all of the plaintiff's factual distinctions
were not necessary because the court noted that "while a history
of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the
probability and forseeability of an accident, we do not deem these
aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of
punitive damages in drunk driving cases."' 58 After noting its
agreement with the plaintiff, but before expressly overruling
Gombos, the court respectfully pointed out Gombos had been de-
cided twenty years earlier when conceptual difficulty existed as to
whether or not a defendant could be held liable for exemplary
damages based on a conscious disregard for the safety of
others.159
The majority next addressed the deterrent aspects 160 of puni-
tive damages concluding that, "[wie discern no valid reason for
155. Id. at 894, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
156. See note 143 supra.
157. See 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
158. Id. This statement by the court raises an interesting question of degree.
In this case there were many factors militating against the defendant and the im-
position of punitive damages was justified. The court's statement that all factors
are not necessary is not very helpful. Perhaps the advice that can be gleaned from
the court's statement is that one should plead every possible factual argument
that would indicate "the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous conse-
quences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those
consequences." Id. at 895-96, 598 P.2d at 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 696. Thus, one is
back to square one in that factual arguments are the essence of a request for puni-
tive damages, the difference according to Taylor arises within the various defini-
tion of actions which merit punitive damages as they are applied by the trial court.
It is interesting to speculate how the court in Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266
P.2d 263 (1954), would have decided the case given the overwhelming evidence of a
dangerous alcoholic. See notes 136-39 supra and accompanying text.
159. 24 Cal. 3d at 896, 598 P.2d at 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
160. Id.; see generally Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973); Dorn v.
Wilmarth, 254 Or. 236, 458 P.2d 942 (1969).
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immunizing the driver himself from the exposure to punitive
damages given the demonstrable and almost inevitable risk vis-
ited upon the innocent public by his voluntary conduct as alleged
in the complaint."''1 1 After discussing the Legislature's posture' 62
on drunken drivers and persuasive statistical data linking drunk
drivers with a high incidence of collisions,163 the court concluded:
It is crystal clear to us that courts in the formulation of rules on dam-
ages assessment and in weighing the deterrent function must recognize
the severe threat to the public safety which is posed by the intoxicated
driver. The lesson is self-evident and widely understood. Drunken drivers
are extremely dangerous people.
1 6 4
Chief Justice Bird concurred with the judgment, but dissented
respecting the majority's reasoning at arriving at its conclu-
sions.165 The Chief Justice emphasized the element of malice, 166
161. 24 Cal. 3d at 897-98, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
162. 24 Cal. 3d at 898, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
"[Tihe Legislature has expressly acknowledged that '[t]he consumption
of alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon an-
other by an intoxicated person.' (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (b))." Id. This
raises an interesting question as to whether and to what extent a legisla-
ture may usurp the evidentiary and causation requirements of a substan-
tive area of law, in this case the law of torts.
163. Id.
164. 24 Cal. 3d at 899, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The court placed spe-
cial emphasis on a recent report submitted by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to the Congress. The court quoted at length the following passage:
Traffic accidents are the greatest cause of violent death in the United
States, and approximately one-third of the ensuing injuries and one-half of
the fatalities are alcohol related. In 1975, as many as 22,926 traffic deaths
involved alcohol. Experimental studies have demonstrated that alcohol
causes degeneration of driving skills and impairment of judgment. How-
ever, the full extent to which alcohol use results in traffic accidents due to
these impairments is unknown. General research trends seem to support
the following facts concerning the relationships of alcohol and traffic
crashes: (1) As many as 25 percent of drivers in non-fatal crashes and 59
percent of drivers in fatal crashes had blood alcohol concentrations
(BAC's) of 0.10 percent or higher. (2) Up to 29 percent of passengers in
fatal accidents showed BAC levels in the legally impaired range. (3) Alco-
hol could be involved in up to 83 percent of pedestrian fatalities. (4) As
many as 72 percent of drivers in single-vehicle fatalities and 51 percent of
drivers in multi-vehicle fatalities had BA C's of 0. 10 percent or higher. (5)
Of the drivers in multi-vehicle fatal crashes with BAC's in the high range,
44 percent were judged by researchers to be responsible for the crashes,
compared to 12 percent judged not responsible. Data on alcohol involve-
ment in crashes based on police reports indicate that the proportion of
drivers who were drinking at the time of a crash increases in relationship
to the severity of the crash .... In general, the relative probabilities of
crash involvement and causation increase dramatically as the driver's
BA C increases.
Id. at 898, 598 P.2d at 858, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 698 (emphasis added by the court).
165. Id. at 900, 598 P.2d at 859, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
and agreed with the pronunciation given in Gombos on the is-
sue.167 She implicitly argued that drunk drivers cannot manifest
a malicious state of mind when she likened malice "with the
knowledge that harm to others was substantially certain or at
least highly probable, 168 but felt that, [plersons who drive while
under the influence often lack a conscious appreciation of the
high risk of harm they present to others."'169
The Chief Justice, not oblivious to the persuasive facts in Tay-
lor indicating the existence of a dangerous drunk who callously
disregarded his own drinking problem and the threat it posed to
society at large, believed that in this case "it may be possible for a
jury to conclude that the 'second time was no accident.' "170 The
Chief Justice then noted that one who had only a "few drinks"
would not fit this category, and that to hold to the contrary would
"open a Pandora's Box."'171
The Chief Justice's opinion contains several inconsistencies
that diminish the forcefulness of her arguments. It is clear that
Chief Justice Bird would require the plaintiff to prove an enor-
mous quantum of evidence. She indicated that there would only
be a possibility of finding punitive damages, despite evidence that
the defendant had been drunk at the time of the collision, had nu-
merous previous drunk driving convictions, had a previous colli-
sion while drunk which caused serious injury, and had
employment which required him to transport alcoholic bever-
ages.' 72 Coincidentally, this large quantum of proof would indi-
rectly satisfy the state of mind the Chief Justice views as
necessary. Yet, a greater quantum of evidence showing repeated
intoxications and deeper level of intoxication arguably enhances
her logic that one who is under the influence to this extent lacks
conscious awareness of his risk of harm to others.173 Obviously,
the greater the influence of alcohol, the less awareness one may
have.
Conversely, the Chief Justice urges that one who has consumed
only a "few drinks" may not manifest the state of mind necessary
166. Id.
167. Id. The Gombos stance is identical to that taken in minority states. See
note 143 supra.
168. 24 Cal. 3d at 900, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting). Ironically, Chief Justice Bird's definition of malice coincides with
the majority's definition of conscious disregard.
169. Id. at 901, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Bird, C.J.. concurring and
dissenting).
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for the imposition of punitive damages. But the question could be
asked: would not an individual become less consciously aware of
the dangerous and probable consequences of his drinking the
more he drank? If this question is answered in the affirmative, as
it must be, then it is logical that those who have consumed only a
"few drinks" are surely more aware of their intoxication, the ef-
fect their intoxication has on their ability to drive safely and the
consequences their conduct holds for the general public, than one
who has consumed heavily and is under a strong influence of al-
cohol. By this logic it would be reasonable and appropriate to
hold one who had consumed only a "few drinks" liable for exem-
plary damages, as long as he had not consumed enough to destroy
his awareness of the risks his intoxication posed to society. In ef-
fect, under the Chief Justice's reasoning, a plaintiff who satisfac-
torily brought forth the requisite large quantum of proof showing
repeated massive intoxications would be inversely proving a lack
of awareness on the defendant's part, while proof of a few drinks,
which may show awareness, nevertheless immunizes the defend-
ant from punitive damages. The Chief Justice has founded her
opinion on two distinct lines of logic, which are unfortunately in
fundamental conflict. The better logic would be to recognize that
the quantity of alcohol one has consumed should be immaterial to
a determination of whether or not the defendant should be held
liable for exemplary damages. Rather, the issue should be de-
cided upon the degree of incapacitation174 one has brought upon
oneself through consumption of alcohol, and what impact that in-
capacitation may have had on one's awareness and conduct.
Justice Clark did not address himself to the issue framed by the
majority, but instead used his lengthy dissent as a forum with
which to express his general dissatisfaction with the doctrine of
punitive damages.175 The majority of the Justice's dissent in-
volves a six-point indictment against the use of exemplary dam-
ages. 1 76 Justice Clark's first two objections to punitive damages
are that they constitute unjust enrichment 177 and that they are an
174. Such tests as a breathalyzer could determine the extent of incapacitation.
175. Id. at 901-06, 598 P.2d at 860-63, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700-03 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
176. The six points that Justice Clark raises are simply a number of commonly
cited disadvantages to the doctrine of punitive damages.
177. Id. at 902, 598 P.2d at 860, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Clark, J., dissenting).
aberration infusing the criminal law into the civil.17 8 It was also
noted that punitive damages are awarded at the jury's whim. This
last remark did not address one problem: even without punitive
damages, a jury will overcompensate a plaintiff with excessive
compensatory damages where they are outraged by the defend-
ant's conduct.
The third objection raised by the dissent is that a jury is in-
formed of the defendant's financial status. However, this is al-
lowed so that a jury may arrive at a figure that is fair to the
defendant but will be one that will nevertheless deter and punish
him.179 This financial information may certainly become a valid
concern in some instances and a major issue at trial;180 still, it
must be remembered that the trial judge has the authority to re-
mit an excessive punitive damages award.' 8 '
Justice Clark's fourth criticism of punitive damages involved
the old argument that such damages serve no deterrent pur-
pose.182 The dissent then became zealous in its atttack on puni-
tive damages, arguing that they were assessed on a purely
fortuitous basis because, "[d]runk drivers not involved in acci-
dents--comprising the vast majority-are not subject to the pen-
alty [of punitive damages]."183 However, this argument overlooks
the fact that selective enforcement is not limited to the imposition
of punitive damages. Even traffic laws, for example, are enforced
on a fortuitous basis because, while many drivers travel in excess
of fifty-five miles per hour, law enforcement officials only issue
tickets to those that are caught. Few, however, would agree this
traffic law is unfairly applied, 84 and that its enforcement should
consequently cease. Nonetheless, Justice Clark attempted to fur-
ther his argument by expressing the thought that those held lia-
178. Id. at 902, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Clark, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Clark also noted the double jeopardy concern discussed earlier. Id.
179. Id. See generally Note, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation
Rule: Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823 (1978). See also, Bertero v.
Nat. Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974); Merlo v. Stan-
dard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 5, 130 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1976); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS (SECOND) § 908 (1979).
180. 24 Cal. 3d at 903, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Clark, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 662.5 (West 1976).
182. 24 Cal. 3d at 903, 598 P.2d at 861, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701. (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
183. Id.
184. Some would surely argue that the 55 mile per hour speed limit is unfair.
This analogy is meant to show the ludicrousness of advocating the elimination or
non-use of a law or legal doctrine on the basis that it is selectively enforced. Even
the criminal law, to which Justice Clark alludes, is dependent upon selective en-
forcement. The point emphasized is that no individual would urge society to re-
lease all murderers, rapists, and burglars because only a fraction of them have
been caught. This is perilously close to the argument which Justice Clark urges us
to accept with respect to the drunken driver.
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ble for punitive damages are "chosen by lot."185 While the
Justice's allusions to The Common Law by Justice Holmes186
makes for very interesting argumentation, the argument leaves a
lot to be desired because drunken drivers held liable for exem-
plary damages are not held so by lot or by the throwing of dice,
but by the terrible devastation to human lives and property they
have caused.
The dissent's fifth and sixth objections to the doctrine of exem-
plary damages are that they fail to take insurance into account18 7
and impair the implementation of the comparative negligence sys-
tem.' 88 The latter objection is certainly a legitimate concern,
whose end result may be viewed as either beneficial or detrimen-
tal, depending on one's point of view. 89 From a practical stand-
point, it appears that the situation Justice Clark envisions will
occur with infrequency since accidents involving drunken drivers
are almost invariably caused by them.
The remainder of Justice Clark's dissent involves a general dis-
cussion of malice and the deterrent effect of punitive damages. 90
Justice Clark, following the line of thought found in the minority
jurisdictions, believes that malice implies evil motive, 191 and that
this element "is not satisfied by conduct only unreasonably, negli-
gent, grossly negligent or reckless. ' '192 He further argued that in-
185. 24 Cal. 3d at 904, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (Clark, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 904, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (Clark, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 906, 598 P.2d at 863, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (Clark, J., dissenting).
189. The arguments for and against preventing a drunken driver from counter-
claiming against a negligent plaintiff are many. For example, one could argue that
in all fairness, a drunken driver, who displayed abhorrent behavior in conscious
disregard of the rights and safety of others, should not be allowed to recover from
an accident primarily his fault. On the other hand, one could argue that to deny a
drunken driver the right to recover from a negligent plaintiff is grossly unfair in
two respects: (1) it sets up the drunk driver as an insurer and is akin to imposing
strict liability on the drunk driver. See note 122 and accompanying text; and (2)
that, as it would be contributory negligence, the negligent plaintiff is completely
absolved of any liability, even in those rare instances where he is primarily re-
sponsible for the accident. However, if the negligent plaintiff were entirely re-
sponsible for his injuries, no punitive damages could be assessed against the
defendant because no compensatory damages, a prerequisite to punitive damages,
would be paid by the drunken driver. In such an instance, the defendant's intoxi-
cation would not be of issues and he should be able to recover from a negligent
plaintiff.
190. 24 Cal. 3d at 906-11, 598 P.2d at 866-69, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 703-05 (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
191. This is the position prevalent in minority states.
192. 24 Cal. 3d at 906, 598 P.2d at 863, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (Clark, J., dissenting).
toxication does not satisfy the malice requirement, and that
"thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Californians each
week reach home without accident despite their driving intoxi-
cated."193 Justice Clark concluded his opinion by engaging in se-
mantical swordplay with the majority over their use of the word
"probable" in describing the nature of a defendant's conduct.194
D. Properly Pleading the Case in California
Several practical considerations should be explored that di-
rectly result from the decision of Taylor. As will be discussed in
section IV.A. the plaintiff in California should avoid using lan-
guage that charges the defendant with intentional conduct be-
cause an insurer may seize upon this to attempt to deny
coverage. 195 It is instead suggested that the allegations be
couched in the identical language used by the court in Taylor, i.e.,
that the defendant acted with intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or
with a conscious disregard of the plaintiffs rights. Also, the plain-
tiff may find it advisable to plead a cause of action for simple neg-
ligence, to obviate any coverage problems and to guard against a
jury finding that the defendant's acts did not constitute anything
more than negligence.
While it is questionable how beneficial Taylor will be in those
instances where a defendant does not own appreciable assets
outside insurance coverage, the case and its approval of punitive
damages would seem to give the plaintiffs attorney considerable
leverage during settlement negotiations. Although no cases have
specifically held an insurance company is under an obligation to
settle compensatory damage claims in order to avoid exposing its
insured to punitive damages, it is likely an appellate court would
do so. 196
Another possible benefit derived from Taylor is that it appears
unlikely a defendant will be able to admit liability in an effort to
prevent the jury from hearing the details of his reckless acts. Fi-
nally, based on the courts language in Taylor, the plaintiffs attor-
ney should submit jury instructions that reflect more artful
193. Of course, the fact that many people are guilty of drunken driving does not
mean that they lack malice, nor does it mean such action is any less dangerous or
outrageous. See note 184 supra.
194. 24 Cal. 3d at 907, 598 P.2d at 864, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (Clark, J., dissenting).
195. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
196. One of the obligations an insurance company has toward its insured is the
protection of his peace of mind. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809,
598 P.2d 452, 151 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979); Crisciv. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426
P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App.
3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
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IV. INSURANCE FOR PUNITVE DAMAGES
The issue of whether exemplary damages may be insured
against has been the subject of extensive commentary19 8 and judi-
197. One source has suggested the following as more appropriate jury instruc-
tions in light of Taylor.
You may award punitive damages against defendant for the sake of exam-
ple and by way of punishment if you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous
consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed
to avoid these consequences.
Or, alternatively:
You may award punitive damages against defendant for the sake of exam-
ple and by way of punishment if you find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove while in
that condition and with knowledge of the safety hazard he created
thereby.
Or, alternatively:
You may award punitive damages against defendant for the sake of exam-
ple and by way of punishment if you find a preponderance of the evidence
that defendant willfully (and voluntarily) consumed alcoholic beverages
to the point of intoxication knowing (from the outset of his drinking) that
he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle.
Sacks & Levy, California Tort Reporter (special Introductory Edition, Supplement
to Los Angeles Daily Journal), Oct. 24, 1979.
198.. See, e.g., Hall, The Validity of Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages--
An Unresolved Question, 4 N.M.L. REV. 65 (1973); Kendrigan, Public Policy's Prohi-
bition Against Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 622
(1969); Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 456 INS. LJ. 27 (1961); Com-
ment, Public Policy Prohibits Insurance Indemnification Against Awards of Puni-
tive Damages, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 944 (1963); Comment, Insurer's Liability for
Punitive Damages, 14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949); Comment, Insurance Coverage and
the Punitive Damage Award in the Automobile Accident Case, 19 U. Prrr. L REV.
144 (1957); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Auto-
mobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960). But see Lambert, Does Lia-
bility Insurance Cover Punitive Damages, 517 INS. .J. 75 (1966); Lentz, Payment of
Punitive Damages by Insurance Companies, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 313 (1966);
Note, Automobile Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 20 S.C.L. REV. 71
(1968). See, e.g., J. GHIARDI, PERSONAL INjuRY DAMAGES IN WISCONSIN, ch. 3 (1964);
R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(f) (1971); LOGAN, LIABLTY INSUR-
ANCE PROTECTION FROM PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES 23 (Def. Research Inst. 1969); 1 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ 1.27, at 1-81 (1976); H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 275C, at 560
(1961); Conley & Bishop, Punitive Damages and the General Liability Insurance
Polciy, 25 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 309 (1975); Gonsoulin, Is An Award of Punitive
Damages Covered Under An Automobile or Comprehensive Liability Policy, 22
Sw. L.J. 433 (1968); Kendrdigan, Public Policy's Prohibition Against Insurance Cov-
erage for Punitive Damages, 1969 INS. COUNSEL J. 622; Long, Insurance Protection
Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1965); Note, Insurance for Puni-
tive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976); Note, Insurance Cover-
age and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV.
cial opinions.199 Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion in Taylor
v. Superior Court,200 correctly stated that "the prevalence of puni-
tive damages in accident cases, especially in the context of deter-
rence, must consider the insurance factor."201 Therefore, this
section, will briefly highlight this concern in order to re-emphasize
the importance of examining the pervasive effect insurance has in
personal injury actions, particularly in drunk driving cases involv-
ing punitive damages.
144 (1957). See generally 7 & 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4312,
4900 (1962 & Supps. 1972, 1973); D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9, at 216-17; Scheil, Pu-
nitive Damage Awards: The Insurance Industry is Placed on Notice, 45 INS. COUN-
SEL J. 350 (1978); Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969); Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 1 (1978); Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REV, 239
(1978).
199. The following cases have held that the general public liability policy does
not provide coverage for punitive damages: American Surety Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d
523 (10th Cir. 1966); Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432
(5th Cir. 1962); Commercial Union Insurance v. Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.
Fla. 1966); American Insurance Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965);
Hanna v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.S.C.
1964); Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton, 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952); Universal
Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Brown v. West-
ern Cas. & Surety Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Tedesco v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Nicholson v. American Fire & Casu-
alty Insurance Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Yesel v. Watson, 58 N.D.
524, 226 N.W. 624 (1929); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.2d
375 (1969); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Commonwealth Casualty
Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa.
Super. Ct. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966); Laird v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 243 S.C. 388,
134 S.E. 2d 206 (1964). The following cases have held that the general public liabil-
ity policy provides coverage for punitive damages: Pennsylvania Threshermen &
Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957);
General Casualty Company of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1952);
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943); Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 734 (1935); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943);
Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); American Fidelity &
Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935); Price v. Hartford Acc. & In-
dem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbie Uriguen Olds Buick,
Inc. v. United States F.I. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Scott v. Instant
Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (1947); Wolff v. General Cas. Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361
P.2d 330 (1961); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923); Carroway v. John-
son, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.W.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); Dairyland County Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). See also Reynolds v. Willis,
209 A.2d 760 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Punitive Damages on Parade: an Up-
date of Recent California Appellate Decisions Affecting Punitive Damage Claims,
1979 INS. L.J. 247, Punitive Damages II: A Further Update of Recent California Ap-
pellate Decisions Affecting Punitive Damage Claims, 1979 INS. L.J.
200. 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
201. Id. at 904, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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The issue respecting the insurability of punitive damages is bi-
furcated into sub-issues. 202 The first is whether the insurance
contract actually covers exemplary damages. This issue is not
within the scope of this article as it focuses exclusively on con-
tractual interpretations. The second issue centers around public
policy that directly involves the deterrence and punishment as-
pects of punitive damages. 2 03
The leading case prohibiting insurance coverage for punitive
damages on public policy grounds was Northwestern National
Casualty Company v. McNulty.204 This drunk driving case in-
volved intoxication, high speed driving, and hit and run on the
part of the insured. The plaintiff, McNulty, who suffered exten-
sive personal injuries, including permanent brain damage, recov-
ered $57,500 at trial, of which $20,000 had been awarded as
punitive damages. 20 5 In an extensive opinion, Judge Wisdom con-
cluded that governing state law viewed the purpose of punitive
damages as punishment and deterrence, and that those purposes
would be lost if a defendant were allowed to shift the burden to
his insurance carrier. Judge Wisdom stated:
Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory and as a deter-
rent and accepting as common knowledge the fact that death and injury
by automobile is a problem far from solved by traffic regulations and crim-
inal prosecutions, it appears to us that there are especially strong public
policy reasons for not allowing socially irresponsible automobile drivers to
escape the element of personal punishment in punitive damages when
they are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway .... To
make that policy useful and effective the delinquent driver must not be al-
lowed to receive a windfall at the expense of purchasers of insurance,
transferring his responsibility for punitive damages to the very people-
the driving public-to whom he is a menace.
2 0 6
202. D. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.9 at 216; W. PROSSER, supra note 9a, § 2 at 13.
203. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 2 at 13.
204. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
205. Id. at 433.
206. Id. at 441-42. Judge Wisdom also argued that:
The argument that insurance against punitive damages would contravene
public policy is sometimes said to rest on the doctrine that "no one shall
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong." Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432, 19 A.L.R.
876 (1921). That doctrine is not necessarily applicable to cases of automo-
bile liability insurance covering punitive damages. In such cases the pub-
lic policy against coverage is not so much to prevent encouragement of
wrong-doing by obstructing the hopes of profit; it is rather to make effec-
tive the discouragement of wrong-doing by the imposition of punishment.
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a
freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions
against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against
Most commentators that have written on the subject have
agreed with Judge Wisdom's forceful arguments. 20 7 The logic of
the argument is certainly compelling. However, the court in Price
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.208 exemplifies the point
made by various other courts that all deterrence is not lost be-
cause the effects of punitive damages are diminished by insur-
ance. These courts have argued that a defendant will not escape
punishment because there is the direct deterrence of ciminal pen-
alties and the indirect deterrence of having one's insurance rates
soar.20 9 Notwithstanding this rebuttal, the underlying justifica-
tions for punitive damages, that of deterrence and punishment,
are measurably eroded if not completely emasculated by insur-
ance coverage.
The posture adopted by McNulty on the issue of insurance and
punitive damages poses problems for the plaintiff's attorney.
First, even though exemplary damages would ordinarily enhance
one's total recovery considerably, without insurance coverage
these money damages almost assuredly will not be as readily col-
lectible. Second, where both compensatory and punitive damages
are requested, a jury may place a portion of a punitive award
under the compensatory headings of pain, suffering and mental
anguish, or include a portion of damages in a punitive award that
are better placed under compensatory damages. The tactical
complexities involved may lead some attorneys to dispense with
punitive damages where insurance is a factor. In such an in-
stance, McNulty would certainly defeat its own purposes because
punitive damages would be discarded simply because of their
complexity.2 10
The most prominent decision propounding the view contrary to
that of McNulty was Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co.211 In Lazenby, the plaintiff recovered a judgment of $1,087.97,
including $1,087.00 in punitive damages.2 12 The court took issue
with the McNulty conclusion that punitive damages serve a deter-
rence purpose. Questioning the effectiveness of this sanction the
court stated:
This State, in regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles, has a great
many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently have not deterred this
criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against
civil punishment that punitive damages represent.
Id. at 440.
207. See note 200 supra.
208. 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
209. Id. at 524.
210. See text accompanying notes 204-06.
211. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
212. Id. at 641, 383 S.W.2d at 2.
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slaughter on our highways and streets. Then to say the closing of the in-
surance market, in the payment of the punitive damages, would act to de-
ter guilty drivers would in our opinion contain some element of
speculation.
2 1 3
The Lazenby court made several other arguments, but con-
cluded with the argument that was perhaps most persuasive to
the majority. The court reasoned that public policy should be the
basis for a decision only when it is clear and unequivocal. Here
the court believed there were competing2 14 public policies that
were ambiguous, and therefore, concluded that the issues
presented in the case should have been decided on the basis of
interpreting and consulting the insurance contract.215
A. Are the Insurance Companies Required to Cover Punitive
Damages?
Another problem facing the plaintiff who requests exemplary
damages in a case involving insurance coverage, is that the insur-
ance carrier will attempt to deny all coverage including coverage
for compensatory damages, by urging that the conduct justifying
the imposition of punitive damages is intentional and therefore
the intentional tort exclusion to insurance coverage should apply.
This potential occurrence has been the concern of some judges.216
This concern is more than likely misplaced because it would he
highly inconsistent for a state to allow the assessment of punitive
damages against drunken drivers on the one hand, and yet allow
insurance companies to deny any coverage on the basis of an in-
tentional tort exclusion on the other. Some states have expressly
ruled on this point, as Missouri did in the case of Crull v. Gleb.217
The court there stated:
Wanton and reckless conduct may, and often does, include negligence. In-
tentional conduct does not. Therefore, wanton and reckless acts of the in-
sured do not amount, in law, to intentional acts so as to permit the insurer
to deny coverage under the provision of a clause, in a liability insurance
policy, which provides that it does not provide coverage for injury inten-
tionally caused by insured.
2 1 8
213. Id. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
214. The court believed that in addition to the public policy behind punitive
damages, there was a public policy behind contracts, particularly insurance con-
tracts, that required that any ambiguity be interpreted against the writer of the
policy.
215. 214 Tenn. at 648, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
216. 24 Cal. 3d at 904, 598 P.2d at 862, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
217. 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964).
218. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
In addition to pleading a cause of action for simple negligence, a
plaintiff could dissuade an insurance company from denying cov-
erage by stipulating with the defendant, which the defendant
would eagerly do, that the defendant's conduct was negligent or
grossly negligent, but not intentional. If an insurance company
persisted in refusing coverage, the defendant could either pursue
alone, or assign, his cause of action against the insurance com-
pany for breach of good faith and fair dealing.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the ramifica-
tions of insurance coverage should be carefully weighed and bal-
anced in those instances where punitive damages are sought in
drunk driving cases.
CONCLUSION
Drunken driving has become a social dilemma of epic propor-
tion in the United States. Every time an individual travels upon
the streets and highways of this country, he is exposed to the in-
sidious and statistically great danger of being killed or maimed by
a drunken driver. If this epidemic of social irresponsibility is ever
to be thwarted, society must devise creative responses that maxi-
mize the punishment and deterrence that drunken drivers are
subjected to.
The imposition of punitive damages against drunken drivers,
under appropriate circumstances, is one such creative sanction.
Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, it is submitted
that intoxicated drivers should be held liable for punitive dam-
ages, notwithstanding strong but unsubstantiated criticism that
punitive damages are not a deterrent. Punitive damages should
be used in conjunction with other sanctions in that they have a
far greater impact than nominal fines and strike the drunken
driver where he is most sensitive--his pocket book.
WILLIAM C. COOPER
